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Abstract: This inquiry considers the meaning of abduction and its uses in
Economic Science. Abductive logic is discussed at some length, in order to clarify
how it is used in this inquiry. In addition, abduction is traced from its appearances
in the writings of pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce and how its
meaning is later carried on in Thorstein Veblen’s Institutional Economics.
Peirce’s influence proves foundational for Veblen’s contributions, as well as for
the writings of John Roger Commons. My research suggests that after Commons,
Peirce’s influence in economics wanes. Additionally, the use of retroduction in
critical realism provides a contemporary example of abduction. This inquiry
concludes by discussing implications of abductive logic, suggesting that abduction
proves essential for the advancement of Economic Science.
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With his infamous article that got published in the American Economic Review
back in 1898, in “Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?” Thorstein
Veblen addresses what he views as the deplorable state of Economics in his day.
Specifically, Veblen ([1898] 1968, pp. 223-227) confronts the ubiquitous use of
deductive logic, arguing it unfit for a superior “evolutionary” science. An
orthodox economic method—rooted in deduction—appears based upon theories of
natural law that depend upon establishing the “normal case,” and then assuming a
“meliorative trend” always towards the normal case. Veblen [1898] 1968, 227)
suggests that so long as economics depends upon the use of deductive logic it will
remain at best “a system of economic taxonomy.” What’s more, in the same
passages Veblen treats induction almost as an accomplice for authenticating the
results and thereby perpetuating the inadequacy of neoclassical economics.
Veblen proposes that economics ought to move past this “pre-Darwinian”
conception of science.
However deep his insight and cutting his critique, Veblen shies away from
explicitly offering a way forward. After his deprecating comments toward the
traditionally recognized methods of logical inference, Veblen leaves the reader
with nowhere to go and nothing to do but wait for the evolutionary emergence of a
better method. However, this is not actually entirely the case. While Veblen is
never clear or explicit about this, his work, and the contributions of many
1

institutionalists following him, and the very evolutionary method he prescribes,
relies upon another form of logic, namely: abduction.
This inquiry explores the use of abduction in economic science.
Specifically, I shall trace the lineage of abduction backwards through American
institutionalism to its pragmatist origins. Additionally, we shall examine the
demise of the use of abduction. This paper also comments on the contemporary
uses of retroduction in critical realism, arguing that it needs to be understood as a
form of abduction. This inquiry concludes with a discussion of the implications of
abductive logic, and also suggests a direction for moving forward.

Abduction: Another Form of Logic
The obvious place to begin this paper is to explain what abduction means and
signifies. Deductive and inductive logic are commonly used even in colloquial
language (albeit often incorrectly) and are certainly staples of academic discussion
regarding philosophy or method. Abduction (alternatively known as retroduction)
registers as seldom used term. (Footnote 1).
Abductive reasoning should be traced back to Charles Sanders Peirce, whose
student, Thorstein Veblen—I shall show—brought the idea of abduction into
economic thinking. Unfortunately, Peirce’s definition of abduction was never
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crystal clear, nor expressed consistently over time. Nevertheless, I shall attempt to
piece together a workable concept of abduction.
Peirce (1955, pp. 150-154) teaches us that abduction is the adoption of
explanatory hypotheses potentially rendering complexity understandable.
Likewise, Peirce (1992, p.140) also phrases this as “adopting a hypothesis for the
sake of its explanation of known facts.” Essentially, abduction is the process by
which hypotheses are created. In its broadest sense, abduction seems to be little
more than guessing. In its intended use in science, abduction is the beginning of
scientific inquiry. (And guessing itself is not a far step from an honest
representation of parts of the scientific process.) It serves here to elaborate upon
what Peirce means by a “hypothesis” (Footnote 2).
To Peirce (1955, p.150), a hypothesis means:

“Any proposition added to observed facts, tending to make them applicable
in any way to other circumstances than those under which they were
observed.”

This conception of a hypothesis is essential to the understanding of abduction,
because in Peirce’s mind abduction is the process of generating such hypotheses.
Whereas induction moves from the general to the specific, and deduction moves
3

from the specific to the general, abduction moves in between antecedent and
consequent. The hypothesis rendered through abduction is one of a connection
between the “known facts.”
Peirce (1992, p. 170) elaborates upon abduction, explaining that it begins
with the colligation of separately observed facts. Here Peirce’s use of
“observation” is referring to experiential observation. Rather than strict external
observation of objects as commonly conceived of with induction, this experiential
observation stems from “the enforced element of the history of our lives.” This,
Pierce clarifies as “that which we are constrained to be conscious of.” Or, phrased
differently, abductive inference does not come from a strict set of facts, but rather
the totality of consciousness as it relates to the question at hand (Footnote 3).
From the premises built up in our experience we then form hypotheses regarding
why the resultant known facts came to be.
Peirce (1992, p.142) clarifies abduction by noting that there is “no definite
probability” of the conclusion as can be found in induction. In other words,
hypotheses are not adopted because we know there is a high probability of their
conclusion being correct. This is essentially implicit in the nature of a hypothesis,
in any sense, and certainly in the Peirceian sense. A hypothesis is adopted based
upon its seeming ability to function in an explanatory capacity. As Peirce (1992,
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p.180) phrases it: “nothing justifies a[n] [abductive] inference except its affording
an explanation.”
A key to understanding abduction is that Peirce meant for it to be seen as
part of a larger scheme of logical inference. This complete logic encompasses all
three forms of logic in the greater process of scientific inquiry. Peirce (2000, pp.
131-132) separates the different forms of logic into “stages of inquiry,” which he
defines thusly:
1.) First, we have abduction or the adoption of a hypothesis. Peirce (2000,
p. 131) teaches us that a hypothesis is generated by furnishing an explanation. One
comes about such an explanation through “pondering the phenomena in all their
aspects.” He further clarifies his definition of an explanation as a “syllogism”
which exhibits the phenomena in question “as necessarily consequent upon the
circumstances of its occurrence.” A syllogism is simply an inference in which the
conclusion is inferred from the premises. To be “necessarily consequent” suggests
that the premises are causally connected to the conclusion. In other words,
Peirce’s hypotheses are causal explanations. The hypothesis is then
“provisionally” held to be “plausible.” Peirce is careful to note that abduction
itself does not provide any “security” until the hypothesis has been tested.
2.) Next we find deduction, which has two parts, namely: “explication” and
“demonstration.” Explication, Peirce (2000, p. 132) teaches us, is the processes of
5

rendering the hypothesis distinct. That is, to make the hypothesis clear by
explicitly defining it. When the hypothesis is clear, demonstration follows
explication. Demonstration, for Peirce, is determining the consequents of the
hypothesis via “deductive argumentation.” In brief, Peirce’s deduction involves
clarifying the hypothesis, and demonstrating the logical consequents. Peirce’s
definition of deduction suggests roughly a narrative account similar to the
traditional conception.
3.) The third stage is induction. Peirce (2000, p. 132) defines induction as
having three parts, namely: “classification,” “probation,” and “sentential.”
Classification is the process of attaching ideas to experience. In other words,
classification is defining as categorizing the relevant pieces of experience.
Probation is the testing phase. The relevant pieces of experience are placed up
against the logical consequents of the hypothesis determined in deduction.
Alternatively, the results are matched up with the deductions. The final part of
induction is sentential, or, an evaluation of the hypothesis. Probationary testing is
concluded by ‘sentencing.’ Elements from the probationary phase are appraised,
and final judgment is provided. In summary, Peirce (2000, p. 132) describes
induction as the process of “… ascertaining how far those consequents accord
with experience.”
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After presenting these processes related to abduction, Peirce again
differentiates abduction from deduction and induction. In clarity and brevity rarely
found, Peirce (2000, p. 133) notes: “… deduction explicates; induction evaluates:
that is all.” To Peirce, abduction serves as the sole contributor to new concepts. In
other words, the creative aspects of abduction register as what is significant to
Peirce.
Peirce’s process of inquiry provides a complete conception from start to
finish, although it must be noted that ‘finish’ is only a temporary state of being, as
the process of inquiry is never truly over (Footnote 4). It should be noted that the
entirety of Peirce’s logic is occasionally subsumed under the rubric of ‘abduction’
alone, as a convenient synecdoche. This means that sometimes abduction ought to
be interpreted as the whole process of inquiry, though the more common use
registers as the but the first stage.

From Peirce to Veblen
How then do we get from early pragmatist philosophy to economic method? As
was alluded above, Veblen serves as the conduit between Peirces philosophy and
Economic Science. Alan Dyer (1986, p. 31) traces connections between Peirce and
Veblen. However, Dyer notes that much of the connection is not explicitly
documented, but rather has been inferred through common points in their work.
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This is an unfortunate consequence of the combination of both scholars’ styles:
Peirce published little in his lifetime, and Veblen was not oriented towards
extensive citation. Despite these points, it has been confirmed that Veblen was at
one time a student of Peirce’s, and Dyer suggests that this interaction, though brief,
proved significantly influential upon Veblen’s career (Footnote 5). This inquiry
seeks to establish this scholarly connection, but at the same time the thesis relies
upon this speculation as a crucial point of origin for our discussion.
One contention that is that Veblen never used the word abduction.
However, as Dyer (1986, p.31) notes that (on some occasions) when Veblen is
using induction he is really using it more in the sense of Peirce’s abduction. This
interpretation of Veblen is not unfounded. As Dyer establishes (and this author
thoroughly supports) Veblen’s philosophy of science follows Peirce in
emphasizing the shift from uncreative methods of inference (meaning deductive
and inductive) towards creative inference, provided exclusively by abduction.
Dyer (1986, pp. 31-35) examines Veblen’s work. This shows up in his article
Kant’s Critique of Judgment, showing that Veblen demonstrated an understanding
of abduction. Notably, Veblen’s “principle of adaptation” (alternatively “principle
of search”) serves to guide ‘induction’ to provide for creative hypotheses. Sound
familiar? Dyer asserts that while writing ‘induction’ Veblen actually means
‘abduction’ in the Peircian sense. This is not merely a charitable interpretation as
8

Veblen first obtained a doctorate in philosophy from Yale University in 1884, and
his understanding of Peirce can be seen in his writings.
Building upon Dyer’s work, Hall and Whybrow (2008, p. 350) note that the
connection between Peirce’s philosophical contributions and Veblen’s economics
actually extends well beyond his theory of scientific knowledge, and into his
enduring contributions to economic science. Hall and Whybrow observe the fact
that Veblen attempted to steer economics away from its traditional foundation in
Newtonian mechanics: with the goal of transforming economics into an
evolutionary science. Most importantly, Hall and Whybrow (pp. 350-351) trace
Veblen’s use of “cumulative causation” to Peirce’s concept of synechism. They
consider Peirce’s inquiry towards an understanding of “continuity” and
“continuousness,” as being embodied in his concept of “synechism.” The term
Synechism is rooted originally in Greek thinking, suggesting continuity and a sense
of things being held together. Hall and Whybrow (p.350) expand upon synechism
by teaching us that it “insists on the necessity of hypotheses involving true
continuity.” Such an approach is clearly in opposition to the atomistic mechanicsbased economics of which Veblen was so critical. And so it comes as no surprise
that Veblen’s work promotes an approach which looks for continuity. Hall and
Whybrow attribute Veblen’s understanding and use of cumulative causation to
Peirce.
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Furthermore, Hall and Whybrow (2008, p. 350) suggest that Veblen
“appears fully indebted” to Peirce’s contributions in these areas. This author agrees
with their sentiment, while also suggesting both Dyer’s and Hall and Whybrow’s
research misses a key connection. Essentially, these authors fail to take their
conclusions far enough. “Fully indebted” is an accurate depiction of Peirces’s
influence on Veblen’s thinking. Dyer connects Veblen’s notion of scientific
creativity to Peirce through abduction. Hall and Whybrow, on the other hand,
connect Veblen’s cumulative causation to Peirce’s synechism. But, both
dimensions are just pieces in the larger puzzle of Veblen’s contribution to
Economic Science. Namely, Veblen’s evolutionary economics depends upon both
of these aspects, as it demands the creation of explanatory hypotheses depending
upon continuity. More specificially,m Veblen’s evolutionary science depends
upon Peirce’s logic of scientific inquiry.
What Veblen adopts and carries forward from Peirce’s aids and abets in
making his contribution substantial. Only through understanding Peirce’s
contributions can Veblen’s larger project to rewrite economic science into an
evolutionary science be understood. Veblen’s critiques of neoclassical economics
are based upon his doubts of atomism as well as reliance upon deduction. As
Veblen sought to advance an evolutionary economics, this suggests continuity and
continuousness, to quote Hall and Whybrow. And this undermines atomism as a
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scientific premise. Evolutionary science also suggests the importance of change,
thereby challenging the use of deductive logic.
Veblen’s writings we are left with a vague idea of opposition towards
atomism and deduction. The implication is that the opposites of these concepts are
the appropriate direction to move forward. Of course, we are given the specific
concepts of cumulative causation, the evolution of institutions, etc…, but the
methodological basis for Veblen’s work is left vague. If, instead, we consider
aspects of Peirce’s work to be the background of Veblen’s theories, the whole
body of work becomes considerably clearer.
In summary, abduction relies upon synechism as a premise in the formation
of inferences, thus providing for the possibility of an evolutionary science.
Abduction, a keystone in Peirce’s logic of inquiry, provides the foundation for
Veblen’s institutional economics.

Peirce’s influence after Veblen:
Given that Veblen needs to be understood as the progenitor of the “Original
Institutional Economics” (OIE), it follows that this Peirceian influence should
continue down through history. This is certainly true for John R. Commons, who
continues to advance Veblen’s project after his passing in 1929. Commons (1934,
pp. 150-151) emphasizes that Peirce had a significant influence upon his method.
11

Commons uses “pragmatism” to refer specifically to “Peirce’s meaning of purely a
method of scientific inquiry,” as opposed to the plethora of other uses it has since
accumulated. While Commons does not specifically discuss abduction, he endorses
Peirce’s method. Again, we have an example of Peirce’s influence without the
luxury of Common’s explicitly using the term ‘abduction,’ so we must infer its use
as part of the method of inquiry.
Unfortunately, the trend in institutional economics remains one of implicit
use, with, at best, an explicit consideration of Peirce’s concept of abduction.
However, in his overarching analysis of The Philosophical Bases of Institutionalist
Economics, Mirowski (1987, pp. 1007-8) suggests that Peirce’s contributions to
scientific inquiry should be “… consolidated into an institutionalist school of
economic theory.” In addition, Mirowski (1987, pp. 1011-13) notes that
abduction stands at the core of Peirce’s scientific method
and suggests that it transferred down the line to Veblen, and others following him.
Mirowski’s work here clearly echoes what has been presented above (Footnote 6).
Mirowski’s expresses a special interest in institutionalist thinking after the
1930s. He traces the decline in Peirce’s influence, which interestingly coincides
with a sharp decline in the overall influence of Institutional Economics. Mirowski
(1987, pp. 1028-30) notes that pragmatism was in decline in this period, and John
Dewey’s thinking replaced Peirce’s. In addition, a next generation of thinkers
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emerged. Mirowski (1987, p. 1028) notes that Wesley Mitchell and Clarence Ayres
took their thinking away from the Peircian traditions. Mitchell, so Mirowski
claims, endorsed a considerably simpler conception of scientific behavior, despite
having been a student of Veblen. This simpler conception led to the perception of
Institutionalism endorsing little more than a naïve empiricist view.
Ayres, on the other hand, is not charged with philosophical ignorance.
Instead, Ayres’ efforts were largely inclusive of philosophical elements. What
stands out with Ayers is that he followed Dewey’s line of reasoning rather than
Peirce’s. In essential respects, Ayres’ legacy could be viewed as a unification of
traditions advanced by Veblen and Dewey. Despite many positive aspects found in
Dewey’s work and subsequent influence, Ayres’ endorsement of Dewey and
neglect of Peirce raises issues for the institutionalist method. While Dewey has
undoubtedly made significant contributions to philosophy and social theory,
institutionalism was originally based upon Peirce’s theories, which Dewey’s work
could not replace without considerable loss from the original project. Mirowski
(1987, pp. 1030) surmises that in the wake of Mitchell and Ayres’ contributions,
the once robust pragmatism based institutional method was reduced to something
more closely resembling “a Popperian version of science.”
Mirowski’s image of the state of Institutionalism appears rather bleak. Is his
diagnosis correct? Unfortunately, to some degree, yes. Blaug (1980, p. 109-10)
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seeks to categorize the Institutional method and comes up with notions of “pattern
modeling” and “storytelling.” At best, Blaug suggests, these are not methods
excluded from the orthodoxy. At worst, they lack rigor and are scientifically
questionable. Blaug’s scholarship is not to blame, but rather the fact that in the
absence of an understanding an application of Peirce, our Institutional method is
left vague. For example, Wilber and Harrison (1978) display the convoluted mess
that interpretations of the institutional method turned into over time. However,
these coauthors fail to examine Peirce’s work, and thus are left with the vague
concepts of “pattern modeling” and “storytelling,” which Blaug later reiterates.
While Mirowski’s evaluation of later institutionalism is somewhat accurate
for a large part of the school, it is not universally true. Certainly, this author
contends that some strains of Veblenian Institutionalism have indeed survived. To
some extent Peirce’s influence—including abductive inference—has always
remained somewhat implicit in works considered ‘institutional’ so long as
Veblen’s influence is also found. But, by and large, the connection has dissipated.
In more recent years the Veblenian approach has had somewhat of a resurgence.
However, this resurgence becomes handicapped when the Peirceian philosophical
basis—namely, the use of abduction, and the logic of scientific inquiry—is not also
revived.
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Retroduction - different term, same idea
As Tony Lawson, critical realism has “recently gained some attention” in the
economic community. To those familiar with Lawson’s “critical realist project,”
abduction may seem strikingly recognizable. Retroduction is another term coined
by Peirce, and can be understood as synonymous with abduction. Retroduction is
also the prescribed form of logical inference in Lawson’s work. As noted,
abduction found its way into economics beginning with Veblen’s critique of
mainstream theory’s use of deduction. Likewise, Lawson (1997, p.16) first traces
“failures” in neoclassical economics to “deductivism.” He then goes forward to
suggest that retroduction is better suited both for economics in general, and for the
application of his methodological precepts.
Lawson (1997, pp. 24, 294) traces his use of retroduction directly back to
Peirce, circumventing Veblen’s implicit use, though he does mention its being used
by “various institutionalist economists” (albeit only in a footnote). What is
important to Lawson (1997, p. 24) is retroduction’s ability to move from “surface
phenomena” to inferences regarding something “deeper.” Specifically,
retroduction allows for the inferences of causation and of stratified levels of reality,
both of which are essential to Lawson’s work. Also, Lawson rails against
mainstream economics’ and its focus on prediction, suggesting, instead, that
“explanatory power” is a more desirable goal. Thus, retroduction, as an inherently
15

explanatory method of inference, is a considerably better fit for Lawson in his
approach to Economic Science.
It should be noted, however, that Lawson’s thinking fails to fully consider
Peirce’s full logic of inquiry, only briefly addressing retroduction, and never
touching upon other aspects. While Lawson is justified in his critique of the
mainstreams dependence upon deduction, he does not acknowledge that deduction
(at least implicitly) has a role to play in scientific inquiry.
Lawson (1997, p.24) contributes the notion of “as if” reasoning to our
understanding of retroduction (abduction). In other words, for Lawson it is
reasoning by analogy or metaphor. This means that given a ‘colligation of facts’
an inference is made based upon another set of conditions, which have in some
ways a comparable structure. Retroduction allows us to infer that with a similar
initial structure, the result will also be similar. By this, Lawson is stipulating that
our inferences arise based upon experiences of comparable events. Such does not
limit our inferences merely to referring to past knowledge. Rather, retroduction
suggests the ability to come up with novel hypothesis with the assistance of a
previous understanding. In the case of Lawson’s work, this previous
understanding has its basis in ontological presuppositions regarding the structure of
the world.
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While Lawson does not trace his use of retroductive logic through Veblen,
the effects of this form of logic provide for great similarities between critical
realism and Institutionalism. In fact, Lawson (2004, p. 184) argues that Veblen’s
work comprises features very similar to those for which Lawson himself
advocates. This argument is posed after considering the legacy produced by
Veblen’s evolutionary essay. Essentially, the prominent features of Veblen’s
Evolutionary Economics (i.e. abductive logic; continuity; social structure; holism;
cumulative causation) correlate undeniably with the prominent features of
Lawson’s critical realism (i.e. retroduction; holistic, continuous, and structured
social reality; causal mechanisms operating through the structured social reality).
In conclusion, Lawson’s project can be seen as a continuation of the sort of
evolutionary inquiry for which Veblen advocated, and this is made possible largely
due to the reliance upon retroductive (abductive) logic.

Abduction, the path toward economics as an evolutionary science
So long as economics stays rooted in static forms of inference all it can do is
rephrase and recalculate based upon the content it already possesses. This stagnant
state is seemingly antithetical to anything calling itself a science. This proves even
more problematic for dynamic subject matter such as that of economics. As we
have seen this contention regarding the decrepit nature of neoclassical economics
17

is not new: Veblen was lamenting its shortcomings over a century ago. Nor is it
outdated as Lawson’s work is in the foreground of current methodology. Given
that abduction somehow holds the key to a better way forward in economics, how
ought we to proceed?
From Peirce and Veblen we can see the methodological path which can lead
to an evolutionary and thereby relevant economic science. Logic which can
encompass both change and continuity proves essential in order to be able to
develop our understanding of the social world. Veblen advocated not for any
specific single method, but rather for underlying methodological principles which
would prove beneficial to economics. Lawson’s work provides a more
contemporary example of the sort of work that can be done based upon abduction,
but this is certainly not the only path. What should be taken from this inquiry is
the necessity for the consideration of Peirce’s principles of inquiry, of which
abductions hold primacy, for offering us a better insights into economic inquiry.
Any specifics related to the path forward are beyond the scope of this
particular inquiry. However, the ideas addressed above are applicable not only to
institutions or instincts, but to the entirety of economic phenomena. The
important lesson to learn is that there is indeed a viable alternative to the
neoclassical method. This alternative stems from an entirely different conception
of how scientific inquiry ought to be done. Abduction is not a solution in and of
18

itself, but rather the means to discovering potential solutions and ways to go
forward.

Footnotes:
1. Abduction is used synonymously with retroduction, another term of
Peirce’s creation. In different pieces he uses either word, sometimes with the other
term in parentheses after the initial use of the selected word. For simplicity’s sake
I have chosen to use abduction (with the exception of the consideration of
Lawson’s work) with the only rationalization for this choice being that it was the
term used when I was first taught about the concept.
2. I would suggest that in dealing with any philosophical writer that a
careful consideration of the specific meaning intended by the use of a given term is
essential. This is especially true with regard to those subsumed under pragmatism
as these authors have a tendency to use colloquial terms in nontraditional senses.
The term “pragmatic” is itself an unfortunate example of such a distortion of
meaning.
3. Experience, and specifically participation and recognition within
experience, plays a significant role in pragmatism. This idea is later embodied in
James’ “radical empiricism.”
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4. Pragmatism promotes the idea that the process of inquiry is never
finished, as our experience (see above) forever continues to provide new inputs to
evaluate.
5. The connection between Veblen and Peirce has been commented on, and
authenticated by many authors, but for our purposes it suffices to use only Dyer,
Hall and Whybrow, and Mirowski. For further consideration see their respective
bibliographies for a more extensive list.
6. Mirowski’s article has received criticism from Institutionalists and, in
some cases perhaps, for good reason. I do not agree with the entirety of its
contents, but for the details used in this paper I believe his work to be well
reasoned and well referenced.
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